Growth Without Development: Role of Corruption in Nigeria’s Economic Malaise by Kurfi, Bashir Usman & Salisu, Mohammed Adaya
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.22, 2015 
 
148 
Growth Without Development: Role of Corruption in Nigeria’s 
Economic Malaise  
 
Bashir Usman Kurfi1 Mohammed Adaya Salisu2* 
1. Department of Business Administration, Ahmadu Bello University, ABU, Zaria, Nigeria 
2. Lancaster Creed Consultants Ltd, Lancaster, LA1 4EF,UK, & Ametex Resource Centre, Zaria, Nigeria 
 
Abstract 
Nigeria has for long made headline news as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. The country is well 
endowed with oil resources and is the largest nation on the African continent in terms of population and gross 
domestic product (GDP), and yet it lags other comparator countries by most development indicators. The paper 
aims to explore the nature, causes, magnitude and consequence of corruption, especially now that the new 
Nigerian government has identified the fight against corruption as its top policy priority. We employed a new 
statistical technique, based on a factor analytic approach to structural equation modelling, to estimate the 
magnitude of corruption and its impact on economic development. This study marks a complete departure from 
previous studies which solely relied on corruption perception indices, which do not necessarily reflect the extent 
of corruption in Nigeria. The findings based on the new dataset on corruption suggest that corruption, as a 
percentage of GDP, has risen from a mere 9 percent of GDP in 1960 to nearly 80% by 2013. Furthermore, results 
from the econometric analysis of the impact of corruption show that corruption does not only retard economic 
growth and development but it also undermines the efficiency of both domestic investment and foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The paper concludes by making a few policy recommendations for curbing corruption in 
Nigeria. 
Keywords: Nigeria, Corruption, Hidden Economy, Economic Growth & Development, Structural Equation 
Modelling 
 
1. Introduction 
Nigeria is a land of paradox. The country is richly endowed with natural resources and it is the largest economy 
in Africa in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and population. Until recently, the country has benefited 
from massive oil windfall associated with rising oil prices over the past two decades or so. In fact, crude oil 
prices rose from a mere $18 per barrel in 1999 to a record level of $114 per barrel in 2011 and 2012 (Figure 1). 
Since June 2014, however, crude oil prices had declined by over 60%, with serious implications for fiscal policy. 
The decades of rising oil prices had prompted the Nigerian government to introduce a fiscal rule based on the 
price of oil, leading to the creation of a stabilisation fund (Excess Crude Account, ECA) for excess revenue from 
crude oil sales. The proceeds from the ECA were initially meant to finance key physical and social infrastructure 
projects but were later shared between the three tiers of government (federal, state, and local governments). In 
addition, the economy has witnessed robust growth, averaging 7.6% per annum during the period 1999-2014 
(Figure 1), and yet the growth has not trickled-down nor inclusive enough to address the challenges of poverty, 
unemployment and the infrastructure deficit. 
 
In spite of the oil wealth and the robust growth performances, the Nigerian economy is still a laggard in terms of 
most indicators of development. Nearly 70% of the population are currently living below the international 
poverty line of $1.25 per day (Table 1); around 60% of youth are unemployed (NBS 2015); social and physical 
infrastructures are inadequate and dysfunctional; and an unprecedented surge in crimes, insecurity and conflicts 
is breeding instability and uncertainty.  
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Table 1: Selected Poverty Indices 
 1995 2003 2010 
Income share held by second 20% 9.12 10.41 9.62 
Income share held by third 20% 13.55 15.43 14.45 
Income share held by fourth 20% 20.22 22.46 21.61 
Income share held by highest 20% 52.11 46.07 48.93 
Income share held by highest 10% 37.10 29.88 32.87 
Income share held by lowest 10% 1.89 2.19 2.17 
Income share held by lowest 20% 5.00 5.63 5.39 
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population) 86.53 83.33 82.20 
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population) 68.65 61.84 62.03 
Poverty gap at $2 a day (PPP) (%) 49.84 44.67 44.79 
Poverty gap at $1.25 a day (PPP) (%) 32.16 26.89 27.46 
GINI index (World Bank estimate) 46.50 40.00 42.95 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Online Database 
 
All this sad state of affairs has largely been blamed on natural resource curse, which has introduced opportunities 
for rent-seeking activities. Widespread corruption, avarice, greed, cronyism and nepotism have all been at the 
heart of Nigeria’s economic malaise, as public finances have been badly managed and squandered by a few at the 
expense of the many. Corruption has undoubtedly undermined the country, helping to keep the majority of 
Nigerians poor and perpetuating instability, especially the long-running conflict with the Boko Haram terrorist 
group. 
 
It is therefore not surprising that the new Nigerian government of President Muhammadu Buhari has identified 
the fight against corruption as one of its cardinal policy priorities. Since coming power on 29 May 2015 on a 
pledge to root out corruption that has long permeated Nigeria, President Buhari has squeezed the flow of public 
funds in an effort to clean up the Nigerian economy. He has put many public projects on hold to review the 
contracts, and ordered many government ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) to consolidate their bank 
accounts for closer monitoring of financial transactions through the implementation of the Treasury Single 
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Account (TSA). He has overhauled the management of the state oil company (Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation, NNPC), while also moving quickly to retrieve stolen money.  
 
The government, in collaboration with the international community, is vigorously pursuing alleged treasury 
looters and plugging leakages through the TSA and prevention of crude oil theft and vandalism. The head of the 
anti-corruption body, i.e. the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), has removed and replaced by 
one of his relatively upright lieutenants. Recently, the anti-corruption campaign has escalated with the arrest, in 
the UK, of Nigeria’s former oil minister, whose five-year tenure was marred by recurring accusations of 
widespread theft. She, along with five other accomplices, was held as part of inquiries into corruption and money 
laundering (New York Times, 19 October 2015). 
 
Whether or not the current government will succeed in curbing corruption in Nigeria is another issue, but the key 
questions are: Why is corruption so pervasive in Nigeria? What are the determinants of corruption in Nigeria?  
What is the impact of corruption on economic growth and development in Nigeria? How could corruption be 
curbed in Nigeria? These and other related questions will be addressed in this paper. 
 
The paper will employ a Structural Equation Model (SEM) methodology to estimate the magnitude of corruption 
in Nigeria and its impact on economic development. Section 2 of the paper reviews the literature on corruption in 
general and the causes of corruption in Nigeria in particular. Section 3 discusses the SEM technique and applies 
it to estimate the size of corruption and the underground economy in Nigeria. Section 4 analyses the impact of 
corruption on economic development. Section 5 pulls together the main conclusions of the paper and policy 
recommendations. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Corruption takes numerous connotations. The narrowest definition of corruption is that it is the misapplication of 
public resources to private ends. In a broader sense, however, corruption can be defined as “an arrangement that 
involves an exchange between two parties (the demander and the supplier) which (i) has an influence on the 
allocation of resources either immediately or in the future; and (ii) involves the use or abuse of public or 
collective responsibility for private ends” (Macrae, 1982, p.678). By misallocating resources, corruption can 
significantly retard social and economic development. There is, however, an alternative view that certain kinds 
of corruption can act as a lubricant that oils the wheel of commerce or government. Even so, corruption is a 
subset of a wider concept of the ‘hidden’ or ‘underground’ economy, including rent-seeking and directly 
unproductive activities (Salisu 2003). 
 
Corruption is a global phenomenon but its nature, magnitude and consequences differ vastly across nations. The 
literature on the causes and impacts of corruption is copious. Earlier studies included those by Colins (1965), 
Macrae (1982, Brownsberger (1983), Aigner et al. (1988), Tanzi (1994), Schleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro 
(1995), and Rose-Ackerman (1999). More recently, however, notable research in this field included World Bank 
(2004), Dreher et al. (2007) and Pieroni et al. (2013). For instance, the World Bank (2004) had put the estimates 
of bribery at more than US$1 trillion per annum, and concluded that tackling corruption, improving governance 
and the rule of law could raise the per capita income of a country by up to 400 per cent.  
 
In the context of Nigeria, however, a substantial number of econometric studies on corruption and its impact on 
economic growth in Nigeria have emerged recently (see, for example, Salisu, 2003, 2005; Segun, 2012; Mathew 
et al., 2013; Ibraheem et al., 2013; Erhieyovwe and Onokero, 2013; Odi, 2014; Sunkanmi and Isola, 2014). 
However, with the exception of Salisu (2003; 2005), all of these studies have relied on corruption perception 
indices in their econometric modelling, either as an explanatory variable when investigating the impact of 
corruption or as a dependent variable when exploring the determinants of corruption. Unfortunately, these 
perception-based indices, produced annually by the Berlin-based Transparency International, are based on 
foreign investors’ perception about a host country’s business environment, and may not necessarily reflect the 
true extent of corruption in the host country. In fact, studies from other parts of the world have reported a low 
correlation between actual corruption and perceived corruption (Mocan, 2004; Dreher et al., 2007). Similarly, a 
comparison of perception-based indices with direct surveys across six Sub-Saharan African countries revealed a 
gap between the perception-based measures and reality (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2006). It is therefore 
likely that policy recommendations from studies based on corruption perception indices can be misleading.  
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2.1 Causes of Corruption in Nigeria  
Indeed, Nigeria has for long made headline news as one of the world’s most corrupt nations, and the corruption 
perception-based indices have contributed to highlighting the pervasiveness of corruption in the country. Since 
its inception in mid-1990s, the Transparency International has consistently ranked Nigeria in the corruption 
league table as one of the most corrupt countries in the world (Table 2). Well, few would dispute Nigeria’s 
premier position in the corruption league table, as corruption has permeated every stratum of society, especially 
so in the corridors of power in recent history. As the cliché goes, “keeping an average Nigerian from being 
corrupt is like keeping a goat from eating cassava” (Salisu, 2003). 
 
Table 2: Nigeria’s Ranking in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
Year Rank/ No. of countries CPI Score  Year Rank/ No. of countries CPI Score  
1995 N.A. N.A. 2005 152nd /158 19 
1996 54th/54 7 2006 142nd /163 22 
1997 52nd/52 18 2007 147th /179 22 
1998 81st/85 19 2008 121st /180 27 
1999 98th /99 16 2009 130th /180 25 
2000 90th /90 12 2010 134th /178 24 
2001 90th /91 10 2011 143rd /182 24 
2002 101st /102 16 2012 139th /174 26 
2003 132nd /133 14 2013 144th /177 25 
2004 144th /145 16 2014 136th /175 27 
Source: Transparency International Website: www.transparencyinternational.org. 
Note: The Corruption Perceptions Index scores countries on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). 
 
Indeed, the pervasiveness of corruption and economic mismanagement poses a serious threat to policy making 
and implementation processes in Nigeria. The Nigerian economy would have been in a much better shape but for 
corruption, unproductive rent-seeking, mismanagement and theft of public resources by the trustees of those 
same resources. So, the key question is what are the main causes of corruption in Nigeria?  
 
There are several causes of corruption in Nigeria, which can be classified into three broad categories: policy-
induced corruption, natural resource endowments, and cultural/socio-political factors (Salisu, 2003). 
 
Policy-induced sources of corruption stem from pervasive and non-transparent regulations which allow officials 
to have an excessive degree of discretion in applying them. For instance, people may be willing to pay bribes to 
government officials in order to obtain pure rents that the regulations may generate. Some of the government-
induced sources of corruption, identified in the rent-seeking literature, include: trade restrictions (e.g. quotas on 
imports); government subsidies; multiple exchange rate practices and foreign exchange allocation (e.g. 
licensing); and wage differential between public and private sectors (Tanzi, 1994). 
 
Endowments of natural resources, such as crude oil, constitute a major source of economic rents since they can 
be sold at a price that far exceeds their cost of extraction.  Sachs and Warner (1995) have argued that resource-
rich economies are more likely to be subject to extreme rent-seeking behaviour than are resource-poor 
economies.  In Nigeria, for example, oil wealth has undoubtedly been one of the main causes of the 
pervasiveness of rent-seeking activities and corruption. The oil boom of the 1970s was largely responsible for 
sowing the seeds of the so-called 'Dutch Disease' syndrome in Nigeria which led to the contraction of 
agricultural output, appreciation of the real exchange rate and a loss of competitiveness of agricultural exports.  
Since then, Nigeria’s agricultural and manufacturing sectors have never recovered their lost glory. Although the 
discovery of oil is a gift for which Nigeria should be thankful, the misuse of the oil revenues to finance large-
scale public expenditure programmes introduced 'grand' (political) corruption in the country.  
 
Societal and cultural factors constitute yet another potential source of corruption. In Nigeria, traditional values of 
gift-giving and tributes to leaders often lead to what Brownsberger (1983) describes as "polite corruption". 
Although not every gift-giving may constitute corruption, the ethics of dependency relations, family pressures on 
government officials, ethnic loyalties and attitudinal tendencies (e.g. greed or love for ostentation) may play a 
vital role in explaining some of the corrupt practices of public servants in Nigeria.  In fact, the Financial Times 
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(1993) has argued that Nigerians see nothing wrong with using public funds to disperse favours to a cousin or to 
build a well for one's village, as it is an informal means of redistributing wealth. Such an act is considered as a 
lubricant or a positive sum game of “give-and-take” which is widely practised in job offers, award of contracts, 
import licences and even in obtaining admission to institutions of higher education. In essence, the visible riches 
of the corrupt and the greedy spur the poor to imitate their life styles and modes of wealth acquisition. 
 
Thus poverty, political instability and other societal forces tend to put pressure on public servants to be corrupt. 
This is especially so when politicians and public servants know that their opportunities may vanish following a 
defeat at polls or their kinsmen place expanded demands on them or they feel compelled to maintain a high 
visible standard of living. In some cases, people who are known to have corruptly enriched themselves are 
regularly courted and honoured by communities, religious bodies, and other private sector organisations. This 
implies that people who benefit from the largesse of these corrupt people rarely ask questions. These sociological 
and cultural causes of corruption are likely to continue for a long time in Nigeria, unless credible legal 
enforcement measures are put in place because the forces which deter corruption are often weak and some of the 
law enforcement agencies are themselves corrupt.  
 
3. Structural Equation Modelling of Corruption  
As stated earlier, the use of corruption perception indices in econometric regressions may provide misleading 
policy conclusions. It is therefore important to utilise other methodological approaches to measure the magnitude 
of corruption. One such approach is based on techniques for estimation of the size of the hidden or underground 
economy. Bhattacharyya and Ghose (1998) have argued that disaggregated hidden economy estimates can 
provide helpful information in identifying the growth of corruption.  
 
A number of techniques have been employed to estimate the size of the hidden economy. One such technique is 
the ‘factor analytic’ approach, based on the statistical theory of latent (unobserved) variables. A variant of this 
approach is the Multiple Indicators and Multiple Independent Causes (MIMIC) technique, which is a special 
case of linear interdependent structural relationship model of Zellner (1970), Joreskog and Van Thillo (1973), 
and Joreskog and Goldberger (1975). The MIMIC framework is a structural equation model for estimating an 
equation in which the dependent variable is unobservable (latent). Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984) pioneered 
the use of MIMIC modelling in the context of the hidden economy. Since then, a number of other studies have 
employed this technique (Aigner et al. 1988; Schneider 1997; Giles 1999; Salisu, 2003; Dreher et al., 2007; 
Pieroni et al., 2013).  
 
The MIMIC model is a powerful technique for estimating corruption because the unknown coefficients of the 
model are estimated separately through a set of structural equations with the indicator variables being used to 
capture the effect of the latent variables indirectly, in our case only one latent variable, i.e. corruption. This type 
of model yields only a time-series index for the latent variable, namely the size of corruption relative to GDP. 
Additional extraneous information is needed to calibrate the index to construct a cardinal time-path of corruption 
(Giles, 1999). Most previous studies calibrated the hidden economy via linking it with a currency demand 
equation (see, for example, Bhattacharyya, 1990; Giles 1999). This approach will be adopted in this paper. 
 
The MIMIC model is characterised by a latent endogenous variable (corruption) with no measurement error in 
the independent variables, and can be formally specified as: 
 
y = λη +ε         (1) 
η = γ'x +ζ         (2) 
where: 
y = a column vector of indicators of the latent or unobservable variable, η. 
x = a column vector of ‘causes’ or determinants of the latent or unobservable variable, η. 
ε and ζ are vectors of errors, and are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated. 
 
Equation (1) constitutes the measurement model for the latent variable η while equation (2) is the structural 
equation for the latent variable, η. Since corruption is a latent or unobservable phenomenon, the factor analytic 
equations (1) and (2) can provide a good methodological framework for estimating it.  Figure 2 shows the 
diagrammatical interrelationships between corruption (η), its determinants (x) and its indicators (y).  
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The theoretical literature has identified four broad sets of determinants of the hidden economy: (i) burden 
imposed by the public sector on individuals (TB), (ii) tax morality (TM), (iii) labour market conditions (L), and 
(iv) structural factors (SF). In this context, and for purposes of estimating the unobservable variable (η), equation 
(2) can be re-written as: 
 
η =γ1TB +γ2TM +γ3L +γ4SF + ζ         (2a) 
 
 
 
Determinants            Indicators 
  Random Influences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The burden on the official economy may consist of burden of taxation (measured by either the average or 
marginal tax rate) and the burden of regulation (measured by the number of regulators or the ratio of the number 
of public sector employees to total employment). The a priori expectation on the coefficient of the tax “burden” 
is negative, implying that an increase in the burden will drive people into the hidden economy. Tax morality, 
however, reflects the readiness with which individuals leave the official economy. A decline in tax morality will 
reduce people's trust in government and will consequently increase their willingness to go underground. Frey and 
Weck-Hannemann (1984) have suggested that the consequences of tax morality can be checked by a growing 
intensity of public controls and a rise in expected punishment, which will reduce the return on hidden activities. 
  
In the case of the labour market, it is hypothesised that the incentive to work in the hidden economy is high for 
the unemployed, since they can work in the underground economy while at the same time receiving 
unemployment benefits where such benefits exist. It is noteworthy, however, that while the demand for 
underground activity rises with unemployment, it is also likely that the supply of job opportunities in the hidden 
economy will fall with rising unemployment. Overall, the effect of unemployment on the shadow economy is 
ambiguous, depending upon the elasticities of demand and supply with respect to the rate of unemployment. 
 
The level of economic development can also influence the hidden economy. Individuals with low per capita real 
disposable income will have a strong incentive to hold multiple jobs and to pay taxes only on the first job (Frey 
and Weck-Hanneman 1984). Empirical evidence from Italy, however, suggests that the size of underground 
economy in the rich North is larger than in the poor South. This positive relationship between per capita income 
and hidden economic activity suggests that the supply of hidden economy jobs may increase with an increase in 
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Figure 2: Structural Equation Model’s Path Diagram for Corruption 
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per capita income. The expected sign of the coefficient of the level of development, however, is a priori 
ambiguous. 
 
The theoretical literature on the hidden economy suggests three sets of indicators: (i) the growth rate of the real 
GDP, (ii) labour market participation rate, and (iii) monetary variables. These constitute the elements in the y 
vector in equation (1) above. An increase in the hidden economy implies that inputs (particularly labour) move 
out of the official economy, with a negative effect on the growth of the observed GDP. In the case of monetary 
aggregates, the literature hypothesises a positive relationship between activity in the hidden economy and cash-
to-demand-deposits ratio, as the bulk of transactions are conducted in cash. 
 
We used the MIMIC approach to estimate the magnitude of corruption in Nigeria based on the four sets of 
determinants and three indicators of the hidden economy. The causal factors are: tax burden (measured by the 
share of taxes in GDP), unemployment rate, inflation rate and real per capita income. The three indicators used 
in the MIMIC analysis are changes in male participation rate, real growth rate of GDP, and changes in cash-to-
demand-deposits ratio.   
 
Table 3 shows the estimates of the hidden economy for the years 1961-2013. The size of the hidden economy 
shows a rapidly increasing trend; it increased substantially throughout the seventies and declined in 1984-85 
before rising again. The declining trend in mid-1980s probably reflects the then General Muhammadu Buhari’s 
policy measures to curb corruption and indiscipline. Tagged ‘War Against Indiscipline’ (WAI), the short-lived era 
of the Buhari-led administration had succeeded in reducing widespread corruption in both public and private 
sectors of the Nigerian economy. But with the ascendancy of General Babangida to power through a palace coup 
in mid-1985, he quickly abolished the WAI decree. Since then, corruption in Nigeria has increased dramatically, 
despite the introduction of a number of anti-corruption agencies such as the Economic and Financial Crime 
Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt Practices and related Commission (ICPC), and the Code of Conduct 
Bureau (CCB). 
 
Table 3: Estimates of Corruption in Nigeria, 1960-2013 
Year % of GDP Year % of GDP Year % of GDP Year % of GDP Year   % of GDP 
1960 9.64 1971 15.78 1982 36.57 1993 54.65 2004 71.54 
1961 10.02 1972 18.54 1983 45.76 1994 58.65 2005 72.74 
1962 10.42 1973 18.55 1984 31.08 1995 65.43 2006 74.30 
1963 10.72 1974 22.45 1985 35.50 1996 64.65 2007 75.86 
1964 11.20 1975 26.43 1986 36.65 1997 58.76 2008 76.67 
1965 11.54 1976 26.80 1987 37.65 1998 62.40 2009 77.22 
1966 11.54 1977 27.85 1988 39.76 1999 64.84 2010 78.23 
1967 12.10 1978 28.94 1989 42.34 2000 67.38 2011 78.43 
1968 12.36 1979 30.08 1990 40.54 2001 70.02 2012 79.12 
1969 12.66 1980 32.54 1991 42.43 2002 71.12 2013 80.11 
1970 12.83 1981 34.65 1992 43.54 2003 72.00   
Source: Estimated with LISREL statistical software using the MIMIC methodology. 
 
4. Impact of Corruption on the Nigerian Economy 
 
To evaluate the effects of corruption on the Nigerian economy, we utilised the estimated levels of corruption 
derived from the MIMIC technique in an economic growth equation framework. The procedure follows a 
conventional growth model in which corruption is introduced as an input, in addition to the traditional factors of 
production such as labour and capital. We divided capital into domestic capital (DK) and foreign capital (FK) in 
order to capture their relative contributions to economic growth. The general form of the production function can 
be written as: 
 
 Y = f(L, DK, FK, CR, Z)            (3) 
where: 
Y = Gross domestic product (GDP) in real terms 
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L = Labour input 
DK = Domestic capital stock 
FK = Stock of foreign capital 
CR = Corruption 
Z = a vector of other variables affecting output, including technical progress 
 
Foreign capital in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) is regarded as the prime source of human capital 
and new technology to many developing countries, so its inclusion in the production function is expected to 
capture the externalities, learning by watching and spill-over effects associated with FDI (Balasubramanyam, 
Salisu & Sapsford, 1999). 
Assuming equation (3) to be linear in logs, taking logs and differencing we obtained the following expression 
describing the determinants of the growth rate of GDP. 
 
εϕψγβα λ ++++++= ∑
=
k
i
ii zcrfkdkly
5
    (4) 
 
where lower case letters denote the rate of growth of individual explanatory variables and the parameters  β , 
γ , ψ , ϕ and λi are output elasticities of labour, domestic capital, foreign capital, corruption and a vector of 
other variables respectively. Alternatively, these parameters can be interpreted as the partial derivatives of the 
growth rate of GDP with respect to the growth rate of the respective individual explanatory variables.  
 
 
The elasticities of output with respect to labour, capital domestic and foreign capital are expected to be positive 
while that with respect to corruption is expected to be negative. Due to the formidable problems associated with 
measuring the stock of capital, especially in less developed countries such as Nigeria, we approximated the 
growth rate of domestic and foreign capital stocks by the share of domestic investment (gross fixed capital 
formation) and FDI in GDP respectively, in line with previous studies (Balasubramanyam, Salisu and Sapsford, 
1999). Accordingly, replacing the rates of change in domestic and foreign capital inputs by the share of domestic 
and foreign direct investment in GDP, respectively, yields the following growth equation: 
 
εϕψγβα λ ++++++= ∑
=
k
i
ii zYCRYFYIly
5
)/()/()/(    (5) 
 
Where: I/Y is domestic investment-to-GDP ratio, F/Y is FDI-to-GDP ratio and CR/Y is corruption-to-GDP ratio. 
 
The signs of the parameters of labour, domestic investment and FDI are expected to be positive on the grounds 
that these three variables could promote economic growth and development, while the sign of the coefficient of 
corruption is expected to be negative, since corruption could largely undermine economic growth and 
development. Similarly, a corruption-riddled economy is likely to deter FDI as well as erode the efficiency of 
both domestic and foreign investments. In other words, in the presence of pervasive corruption, the growth 
enhancing effects of FDI and domestic investment could be constrained. As a result, equation (5) can be 
modified to include interaction terms between corruption and FDI and domestic investment, as follows: 
 
 
εpiθϕψγβα λ ++++++++= ∑
=
k
i
ii zYCRYIYCRYFYCRYFYIly
5
)/)(/()/)(/()/()/()/(
                (6) 
  
The expected signs of the coefficients of the interaction terms, θ and π, (the coefficients of the interaction term 
between corruption and FDI and the interaction term between corruption and domestic investment) are 
ambiguous, depending on whether or not the positive impact of FDI (domestic investment) on growth outweighs 
the negative impact of corruption. In a country where corruption is pervasive, coefficients of both interaction 
terms are expected to be negative, whereas in economies where corruption is milder, the coefficients should be 
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positive suggesting that either the beneficial effects of investment outweigh the efficiency-eroding prowess of 
corruption or that some level of corruption is needed to grease the wheels of commerce! 
 
The model, represented by equation (6), is estimated using annual data over the period 1965 to 2013 when 
complete sets of data were available.  Table 4 shows the estimated parameters for the four sets of equations. In 
equations (a) and (b) in the table, the dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP, using official 
GDP figures while in equations (c) and (d), the dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP, 
using both official GDP and the estimated GDP derived from the hidden economy. In each case, the difference 
between the two equations is the inclusion of an oil dummy variable to reflect the exceptionally high oil price 
episodes.  
 
All equations were estimated with the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. The overall fitness of the statistical 
relationship in all equations is good as demonstrated by the high R2. In addition, none of the equations suffers 
from the econometric problems of serial correlation, incorrect functional form and residual non-normality of 
errors as the calculated chi-squared values for these three test statistics are well below their tabulated chi-squared 
values corresponding to the appropriate degrees of freedom.   
 
As is widely expected, in the first two equations where the dependent variable is the growth rate of the official 
GDP per capita, the estimated coefficient on corruption is negative and statistically significant at the 10 per cent 
level or lower. However, in the two equations where the dependent variable is the growth rate of the combined 
per capita GDP of both the official and the hidden economies, the estimated coefficient of the corruption variable 
is positive but not statistically significant. This is not surprising because the dependent variable in equations (b) 
and (c) includes the growth rate of the hidden economy which should correlate positively with corruption.  
 
In the case of domestic investment and FDI, their estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% level, signifying the important contributions they play in the economic development process. The 
results also strongly suggest that FDI plays a more important contribution to economic growth than domestic 
investment. Similarly, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term between corruption and domestic 
investment and the estimated coefficient between the interaction term between corruption and FDI are negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level in equations (a) and (b) but not in equations (c) and (d). This result 
suggests that corruption erodes the efficiency of both domestic and foreign direct investments. With regards to 
domestic investment, especially public investment, the result appears to lend support to the widely held view that 
capital-intensive projects constitute breeding grounds for corruption in Nigeria. In other words, the efficiency of 
public investment is severely curtailed by corruption. This finding concurs with conclusions of a number of 
empirical studies elsewhere (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Mauro 1997; Tanzi and Davoodi 1997; Ades and Di 
Tella 1997) that corruption adversely affects the productivity of public investment and distorts the effects of 
industrial policy on investment.  
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Table 4: Estimated Growth Equations for Nigeria (1965-2013)  
              Dependent Variable: GDP per capita growth rate 
 Official Economy       Official & ‘Hidden’ Economies 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
INTERCEPT 1.735*** 1.494*** 2.59*** 2.317*** 
LF 0.381*** 0.316*** 0212 0.216 
I/Y 0.062*** 0.069*** 0.577*** 0.583*** 
F/Y 0.134*** 0.138*** 0.867**** 0.881*** 
CR -0.024*** -0.023*** 0.021 0.021 
(F/Y)*(CR/Y) -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
(I/Y)*(CR/Y) -0.176*** -0.168*** 0.004 -0.005 
OILDUM 0.231* --- 0.125* --- 
2R  0.854 0.866 0.978 0.978 
LM-SC 3.23 2.56 2.91 2.78 
LM-FF 2.43 2.35 1.97 1.84 
LM-NM 0.65 0.61 1.58 1.71 
Notes: Figures in parenthesis denote absolute values of t-statistics; *, **, *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively; LM-SC, LM-FF and LM-NM denote Lagrange multiplier test 
statistics for residual serial correlation, functional form, and normality respectively. On the relevant null 
hypothesis the test statistics for residual serial correlation and functional form are distributed as χ2 with 1 
degree of freedom. In the case of residual normality, it is distributed with χ2 with 2 degrees of freedom. At 
the 5% significance level, the critical χ21 = 3.84 and χ22 = 5.99. 
OILDUM is a dummy variable for high oil price episodes taking the value of 1 for the periods 1973-1980, 
1990-1992, 2003-2008, 2012-2013, and 0 for all other periods.  
 
With regards to the negative coefficient of the interaction term between corruption and FDI, the result implies 
that the interplay between FDI and corruption may result in a positive private rate of return even though the 
social rate of return may be negative! The implications of the results of the growth equation are that in as much 
as corruption adversely affects the growth promoting efficacy of investment, it would undermine economic 
development by not unleashing its full potential for job creation, poverty alleviation and income growth.  
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
This paper has explored the nature, causes and impact of corruption in Nigeria using a new set of data on 
corruption based on structural equation modelling. Previous studies on corruption in Nigeria have relied solely 
on corruption perception indices which may not necessarily reflect the true extent of corruption in the country 
because such indices do not take into account the causes and indicators of corruption and the associated 
underground activities. By explicitly taking into account the independent causes and indicators of corruption, the 
indices produced by the structural equal model were calibrated using a monetary demand equation to determine 
the proximate magnitude of corruption. Using the new set of corruption data in the real per capita GDP growth 
equation provides strong evidence that corruption not only retards economic development in Nigeria, but it also 
reduces the efficiency of investment in the economic growth process. This calls for a well-orchestrated effort to 
nip corruption in the bud, and thus placing the fight against corruption on top of the policy priority agenda of the 
new Buhari-led government is a right step in the right, and must be pursued with vigour.    
 
However, combating corruption requires a multidimensional approach that addresses the many causes, facets and 
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structural issues that corruption entails. According to the World Bank, this also requires courage and a long-term 
commitment by a variety of anti-corruption actors, including political leaders, public servants, civil society, 
media, academics, the private sector organisations and international governmental and non-governmental 
agencies. 
 
Indeed, Nigeria has a number of anti-corruption policies but the problem is lack of implementation of those 
policies. What is now needed is the political will to implement the anti-corruption laws and regulations in a 
comprehensive and methodical manner. That is why the current stance taken by President Buhari on zero 
tolerance on corruption is commendable. Even so, providing leadership by example alone may not curb 
corruption unless the government has put in place an effective monitoring and surveillance mechanism to ensure 
that all stakeholders play by the same rule book. For instance, the president and his deputy have publicly 
declared their assets with the Nigerian Code of Conduct Bureau, but there is a lot of inertia from high-profile 
public servants and politicians to do the same. Similarly, there is the need for proper civil service reforms to 
address the culture of bureaucratic elitism and to inculcate into them the change mantra of the new government, 
while at the same conducting attitudinal reforms to change societal perception of corruption, including dramatic 
changes in attitudes toward political processes, and mobilising political will for change. Without mobilisation of 
civil society, government officials are unlikely to follow through on anti-corruption reforms once they enter 
politically complex terrain! 
 
Other anti-corruption measures that the government should pursue include strengthening internal and external 
control systems, and introducing stiffer statutory penalties on corrupt persons, making dismissal from the civil 
service both a painful and credible threat. The proceeds of corruption must also be fully recovered from corrupt 
public servants.  
 
On the fiscal front, the government should introduce financial disclosure, open budget process and zero-
budgeting framework as well as ensuring that all budget proposals by all ministries, departments and agencies 
(MDAs) are in line with the country’s overall medium term expenditure framework. 
 
Finally, the government must scale down pervasive regulations which contribute to the demand and supply of 
corrupt activities, through unnecessary lobbying, rent-seeking and directly unproductive activities. In addition, 
public procurement processes must be streamlined with little or no room for personal discretion. 
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